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The aim of this paper is to describe 
the influence of automation support 
on Air Traffic Controller 
performance, workload and 
Situation Awareness (SA). 
Controllers handle traffic through 
means of tactical control involving 
heading, speed and altitude 
instructions. Future Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) concepts, such 
as Single European Sky ATM 
Research (SESAR) and NextGen, 
promote the use of 4D trajectories, 
thereby introducing a time-
dimension to current control tactics 
(SESAR, 2007). At present, 
Amsterdam Area Control (ACC) 
delivers traffic over to Schiphol 
Approach control (APP) via three 
Initial Approach Fixes (IAFs) with 
a margin of plus or minus 120 
seconds between the planned time 
and the actual time. This variability 
can make it difficult for APP 
controllers to merge traffic streams 
and build a landing sequence, 
especially during peak periods. In 
the future, a change in delivery 
accuracy to less than plus or minus 
30 seconds is foreseen thereby 
aiming to increase the punctuality 
of flights.  
 
Description of work 
An undesirable increase in 
workload is expected for 
Amsterdam ACC controllers to 
achieve such accuracy without any 
system support. Therefore, a Speed 
And Route Advisor (SARA) was 
developed. This tool provides ACC 
controllers with a speed and route 
advise with which the aircraft can 
meet its planned time over the IAF 
with the desired accuracy. Whilst 
such a tool is necessary to keep the 
workload of ACC controllers within 
limits, a potential drawback is the 
possible decrement in controller’s 
SA (e.g. Endsley and Kiris, 1995; 
Endsley, 1997), which has been 
shown to be one of the principal 
competencies of controllers (Oprins 
et al., 2006).  
An experiment was performed to 
validate SARA in its ability to 
support the controller in accurately 
delivering traffic to APP over the 
IAF and to assess its impact on their 
workload and SA. Eight Amsterdam 
ACC controllers and four 
Maastricht Upper Area Control 
Center (MUAC) controllers 
participated in seven scenarios in an 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
simulator for four days. Seven 
scenarios were run with varying 
SARA configurations (e.g. only 
speed advisories, or speed and route 
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Results and conclusions 
The results showed a significant 
improvement in delivery accuracy 
with the support of SARA. Self-
report measures of workload varied 
significantly between the different 
scenarios, and appear to be related 
to familiarity with SARA. Objective 
measures of workload, as measured 
through the amount and duration of 
radiotelephony (R/T) calls and 
manual inputs, decreased. SA 
significantly decreased with the use 
of SARA, although controllers still 
rated it above average. This was 
consistent for all SARA conditions. 
Controllers indicated that they were 
checking SARA advisories in an 
effort to understand SARA’s ‘plan’ 
which often deviated from their 
own strategy. However, 
unfamiliarity with SARA may have 
been an influencing factor. 
 
Applicability 
The results clearly showed the 
benefit of SARA in supporting 
controllers in accurately delivering 
traffic over the IAF without a 
significant increase in workload. 
These findings implicate the 
potential for SARA as a means 
towards time-based operations 
around Schiphol Airport. The 
impact of the use of SARA on SA, 
however, should be carefully 
considered in future design and 
implementation efforts. 
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1.1 ATC performance 
The primary aim of Air Traffic Control is to expedite and maintain a safe and orderly flow of air 
traffic. Similar to other process control tasks in transportation (aviation, shipping, railways) or 
process industry (e.g. chemical and nuclear plants), the ATC task is considered highly complex 
and dynamic. The continuous flow of moving aircraft cannot be stopped; timely actions are 
needed to create safe and most efficient traffic flows before possible collisions become critical. 
Complex cognitive processes are required to handle the great amount of dynamically changing 
information in a three-dimensional environment (Garland, Stein & Muller, 1999). Therefore, 
ATC is also called a complex cognitive or high-performance skill (Schneider, 1990). 
Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland; LVNL) has designed the 
so-called ATC Performance Model (Oprins, Burggraaff and Van Weerdenburg, 2006; Oprins, 
2008), which visualizes the complex cognitive processes of air traffic controllers. This model 
has been applied as a general framework for selection and training design. Since a few years, it 
is also used at LVNL to assess the impact of new developments in ATM system design on the 
human role of controllers in a paper study, Human Factor Indication (HFI) and in real-time 
simulations. The model is the result of a competence analysis performed at LVNL based on 
literature research and workshops with controllers (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. The ATC Performance Model 
 
The model shows the importance of cognitive processes in which situation assessment plays a 
central role. Information processing guides the actions and this results in safe and efficient 





1.1.1 Situation awareness 
A common assumption is that operators in dynamic and complex tasks such as ATC create a 
mental representation of the changing environment, which makes it possible to keep the relevant 
but transient information in working memory (Garland, Stein & Muller, 1999). Pattern 
recognition plays a central role; the controller groups aircraft in a certain way to memorize their 
positions. These patterns help them to create order in seemingly chaotic situations by streaming 
traffic flows. Much research has been done on how controllers develop the three-dimensional 
‘mental picture’ of the traffic situation. This is usually referred to as situation assessment, 
defined as follows:  ‘The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time 
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near 
future’ (Endsley, 1999). Situation Awareness (SA) is considered the product of the process of 
situation assessment that takes place at three levels: perception (SA1), interpretation (SA2) and 
anticipation (SA3). Attention management strategies are crucial to keep this ever-changing 
‘picture’ up-to-date (Shebilske, Goetl and Garland, 2000).  
 
1.1.2 Workload management 
Controllers regularly switch between low and high mental workload, depending on the traffic 
situations (e.g., number of aircraft, complexity). This is called workload management. But 
mental workload has also a strong subjective component (Averty, Collet, Dittmar, Athènes and 
Vernet-Maury, 2004).  
Controllers continuously apply strategies, which are individually different, to keep safety 
(conflict detection), efficiency (traffic delay) and their own mental workload (‘personal 
efficiency’) in optimal balance (Oprins & Burggraaff, 2006). SA is needed to identify and enact 
the most safe and efficient solution to solve specific (conflict) situations. In addition, controllers 
keep their own mental workload under control by adjusting their strategies towards less effortful 
if needed. If possible they revert to routine actions, standard procedures and ‘simple’ solutions 
that need less attention and that gain time, for instance, by a lower load of radiotelephony. 
Depending on the evolving situation (routine – non-routine), they switch between low and high 
workload. 
 
1.2 Reduction of work complexity in ATC 
 Internally, LVNL is coping with a shortage of controllers. This is not uncommon in many busy 
and complex airports. Due to the complex cognitive nature of the ATC task only a small number 
of people are able to acquire the required competences within a reasonable period of training 
(Schneider, 1990). LVNL is attempting to solve this problem by improving selection and 
training, and by designing new ATM systems that make the work less complex. Research on 





has shown that ineffective situation assessment and workload management are the two most 
important reasons for failing (Oprins, 2008). This suggests that these competences are more 
difficult to learn than others and require extra attention in designing less complex ATM 
systems.  
Previous research has shown that increasing automation, as expected in future ATM systems, 
could make work less complex. A possible risk of more automation is often referred to as the 
‘out-of-the-loop’ performance problem (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). In case of automation failures 
system operators may have diminished ability to perform tasks manually, due to lesser 
awareness of the state and processes of the system, i.e. SA. There are three reasons why this 
happens. First, monitoring tasks may lead to vigilance problems. Alertness decreases as 
controllers usually have much trust in the equipment. Second, passive information processing 
seems to be inferior to active information processing in detecting the need for manual 
intervention and reorientation to the state of the system. Third, without any feedback, people are 
really out of the loop and they cannot assess the effectiveness of their requests and actions.  
More automation can also increase SA (Endsley & Kiris, 1995). In a more monitoring role, 
controllers are better able to distribute their attention, especially when the system provides 
superior, integrated information to the controllers. In addition, SA may be improved by a strong 
reduction of workload. A partial automation strategy should keep the negative and positive 
effects in balance. It is usually argued that routine tasks should be fully automated to reduce 
workload, while automation should support SA by offering better and more integrated 
information to the controllers. 
These issues have been addressed in research on ATM system design (Endsley, 1997). ATM is 
also moving towards more monitoring (cf. ‘supervisory control’; SESAR, 2007).  Human-
centred design in ATM suggests that routine tasks such as radiotelephony should be automated 
(cf. datalink), that the presentation of information to controllers should be improved for 
supporting SA, and that decision support tools are needed to choose the right solutions. 
However, ATM system designers are still searching for the right balance in automation, also in 
relation to fallback systems (machine or human). 
At Schiphol Airport, work complexity for controllers is particularly high because of the large 
numbers of air traffic and bunching associated with peaks. The ATM strategy of LVNL focuses 
on accommodating a growth of air traffic as expected in the future while making work less 
complex. For this purpose, support tools for controllers will be introduced at LVNL. The main 
question is how these tools can be designed in such a way that situation awareness will be 






1.3 Current situation at Schiphol Airport  
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (EHAM) is the busiest of the Netherlands, using a maximum of 3 
out of 6 runways to balance capacity and demand. It is one of the two main hubs of Air 
France/KLM, mainly used by Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM). KLM runs a hub-and-spoke 
operation, therewith providing short connection times between flights, which results in four 
arrival peaks and four departure peaks per day and off-peak periods in between.  
Departure peaks will normally be managed by the use of two take-off runways and one landing 
runway, resulting in a capacity of up to 80 departures and 38 arrivals per hour. Two landing 
runways are used during arrival peaks in addition to one take-off runway, and the hourly 
capacity for this combination is 65 arrivals and 40 departures. Only one take-off and one 
landing runway are used in off-peak periods, with an hourly capacity of 38 arrivals and 40 
departures. The total number of movements for Schiphol is circa 1100 (February 2009) per day.  
Air Traffic Control service in the Netherlands is provided by MUAC, the Ministry of Defence, 
and the LVNL. In terms of the arrival streams for the Schiphol Terminal Manoeuvring Area 
(TMA), traffic is fed by Amsterdam ACC via three entry points called Initial Approach Fixes 
(IAF). These three individual traffic flows are subsequently merged to either in two or one 
stream for the landing runway(s) in use. This merging after the IAF is done by Schiphol 
Approach and currently is done by the use of individual manoeuvring instructions (i.e. radar 
vectoring). System support is provided to avoid overloads in the TMA. This system support is 
an arrival management system called LVNL Inbound Planner (IBP), and assigns arriving 
aircraft a landingslot 14 minutes prior to passing the IAF. This landingslot is the basis on which 
an Expected Approach Time (EAT) for the IAF is calculated. ACC is subsequently required to 
deliver the arriving aircraft for Schiphol to APP via the IAF within plus or minus 120 seconds 
from the EAT.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the bunching associated with the arrival peaks is a 
frequent and undesirable disturbance of the desired stability of the Schiphol ATM system. 
These bunches often lead to a temporary increase in workload for the ACC controllers, and has 
a negative impact on the complexity and therefore also on the efficiency of the operation. The 
APP controllers often have difficulties with the way the traffic is presented to them at the IAFs 
and the subsequent merging of the streams. Amongst other reasons, some of these difficulties 
can be ascribed to the 120 seconds margin that can be applied when deviating from the EAT by 
ACC. Steps are foreseen that can potentially alleviate some of these difficulties and reduce the 
task complexity of the controllers working position. 
 
1.4 Expected future situation at Schiphol Airport 
The strategy of LVNL is laid down in the ATM System Vision and Strategy and lists all the 





accommodate an increased traffic demand with improved safety performance, and to improve 
the environmental performance as a consequence of more demanding targets. Amongst a 
number of developments focussing on the entire operation, the following specific developments 
focus on the improvement of the management of arrival traffic at Schiphol (see also SESAR, 
2007): 
• Introduction of Trajectory Based Operations (TBO); 
• Continuous Descent Approaches (CDAs) during daytime operations to enhance 
environmental performance; 
• Development of conflict-free routes in the TMA to reduce task complexity for APP 
controllers; 
• Noise-friendly approach procedures;  
• More accurate inbound planning. 
 
1.5 LVNL ATM system goal 
The current LVNL ATM System is insufficiently able to cope with fixed, noise friendly and 
conflict-free routes in the TMA, as these cannot be implemented under the assumption that 
current capacity levels must be met. The main reason for this is the inaccuracy following from 
the fact that the traffic is delivered by ACC to APP within a plus or minus 120 seconds time 
window. This inaccuracy leads to the requirement for APP to manually optimize the handling of 
the arrival streams within the TMA. It is assumed that improved accuracy at the delivery from 
ACC to APP will result in more stable and predictable traffic streams in the TMA. These more 
predictable and stable traffic streams will result in better service to the customer, but should also 
lead to a reduction of work complexity for controllers.  
The night-time-operations currently in use at Schiphol resemble CDA procedures in which 
aircraft are able to fly their own descent profile and accompanying speeds within the active 
constraints. This increases flight efficiency and reduces CO2 emissions. However, these 
procedures, consisting of fixed arrival routes from 7000 feet to the runway threshold, result in a 
capacity of 24 arrivals per hour, well below the daytime number of 35 arrivals per hour. This 
means that the required capacity levels cannot be met with this type of operations in daytime 
situations under current circumstances. Additionally, the current inaccuracy is also a limiting 
factor in this perspective. An improved accuracy in the delivery from ACC to APP is a 
requirement for the introduction of high capacity CDAs during daytime operations.  
A second aspiration for improved accuracy is the increased workload in case of bunching. If 
aircraft are not transferred in a bunch, but longitudinally separated, then the workload is much 
better manageable resulting in stable and predictable traffic streams. As a result the task to 





The last aspiration for improved accuracy is predictability and transparency to the airspace 
users. Pilots will be better able to manage the most efficient flight profile if their flight is 
planned well ahead. As improved accuracy will ultimately lead to improved transfers and 
therefore a better planning, it is assumed that there are major benefits on the airspace users’ 
side.  
As mentioned before, the current ATM System does not allow for additional workload for the 
controller by requiring them to increase their delivery accuracy of arrival traffic over the IAF 
from plus or minus 120 seconds to plus or minus 30 seconds. Previous studies have shown that 
estimations of future aircraft positions by controllers become increasingly inaccurate the further 
in time the prediction is made (Boudes and Cellier, 2000).  Since in the future ATM System 
Strategy an increased accuracy is required earlier in time, this would place a too great a burden 
on the capabilities of controllers. In order to mitigate this potential increase in workload, system 
support is foreseen to enable the increased accuracy performance target to less than plus or 
minus 30 seconds. The Speed And Route Advisor (SARA) tool was designed to support the 
controller to meet this target. 
 
1.6 Basic SARA functioning 
The SARA tool operates by providing controllers a speed and route combination for every 
inbound flight. The speed and/or route combination is displayed to the controller and it will 
allow the controller to give a single speed and route clearance to the aircraft for the entire 
descent.  A single clearance will have the potential advantage that it will decrease the workload 
for the controller and aircrew.  It will also allow the aircrew to use the Flight Management 
Computer (FMC) in the descent, thereby optimizing the descent profile as much as possible 
within the active constraints.   
The SARA tool relies on several functions in the ATC system: IBP, surveillance data, and a 
Trajectory Predictor.  The performance of these support functions determines the performance 
of SARA.  The SARA logic processes a flight in seven steps.  These steps are described below:  
 
1. The flight appears to the ATC system and is entered in the IBP.  
2. Once the planning is considered stable, the SARA process starts.  
3. SARA uses the Expected Approach Time (EAT) for the flight.   
4. SARA interacts with the TP and collects the fights current position and plan.  It also uses 
the TP to calculate the flights Estimated Time Over (ETO) the IAF.  For this calculation 
SARA assumes that the route entered into the ATC system will be the route flown.   
5. SARA compares the EAT and ETO.  If the difference is outside a set threshold (less than 
plus or minus 30 seconds) it will initiate the process to find a new speed/route combination 





6. An iterative process is started where SARA uses the TP to calculate a speed/route 
combination that will bring the aircraft to the IAF such that the EAT and ETO is below the 
threshold value.   
7. Once a speed and route combination is found that is within the threshold it is 
communicated to the controller in an integrated manner on the radar screen. For this 
experiment, the advisories were integrated in the aircraft label. 
 
When developing new concepts it is difficult to determine the requirements in enough detail 
when the system is only described at a conceptual level. In the development of SARA this was 
approached by the use of iterative development cycles. Each cycle consisted of three steps: 
requirement definitions, technical development and system testing. The test results from one 
cycle feed into the requirements of the next. The SARA functionality was developed using five 
such development cycles. It allowed the controllers to try out a range of possible solutions. In 
each cycle the most promising where selected for further development. In addition to being a 
flexible development process it also kept the development costs down because ideas that proved 
difficult, expensive or not helpful during development could be detected early.   
In accordance with earlier recommendations, controllers remain in control and are fully 
responsible for separation of the traffic (Prevot, Lee, Callantine, 2003). SARA only supports 
with calculating the speed and route combination best suited to meet the planning. In future 
developments of SARA a conflict detection and resolution step could be added to the process.   
 
1.7 The impact of SARA on air traffic controllers 
With SARA, the operation at Schiphol will gradually change from a tactical first-come-first-
serve operation towards a time-based operation. These operations might have a quite large 
impact on the controller’s SA, and hence his subsequent capacity to act. However, the degree to 
which SA is affected depends on the specific operational design and task allocation between 
humans and systems. The SARA tool could help controllers to instruct the right speeds and 
routes to aircraft in order to meet a specific point on time. This might decrease their workload as 
once the instruction is given the controller mostly needs to monitor the follow up. Only in case 
of a conflict he would need to give an updated instruction. 
With SARA, controllers will have to incorporate time as a fourth dimension in their mental 
picture in order to plan, prioritize and sequence flows, as well as to assure separation. This 
requires more anticipation and strategic thinking than nowadays. In their current way of 
working, their decisions are based on certain three-dimensional patterns of aircraft on a certain 
moment of time. Being in time on a waypoint within small margins changes the controllers SA 
because more ‘thinking-in-time’ is required than they are used to. Currently the controllers are 





Consequently, with SARA tactical control will move towards more strategic control with a 
larger planning horizon (Oprins, Zwaaf, Eriksson, Van de Merwe and Roe, 2009).  
In addition, SARA implies that certain tasks of controllers are moved to the system. Currently, 
controllers determine the speeds and routes for aircraft by themselves. SARA will help them in 
the decision making process by providing speed and route advisories. Controllers might lose 
their feeling of control when their work moves too much towards supervisory control. They 
might have difficulty to trust the system when solutions are in conflict with their own plan and 
their SA might be undermined. In other words, they cannot use their own strategies for traffic 
handling anymore. Dependent on the specific design of SARA, controllers could have less 
insight into the specific flight paths of aircraft. This will definitely decrease their SA. 
Consequently, it might make it difficult for them to renew their SA if manual interventions are 
needed in case of system failures and other circumstances (e.g. weather) in which SARA may 
not work. Switching between these automated (routine) and manual (non-routine) operations 
can substantially increase their workload. It depends on the frequency of using conventional 




To understand the impact of SARA on the behaviour of controllers an experiment was devised 
that investigates the influence of SARA on controller’s delivery accuracy, workload and 
Situation Awareness. Furthermore, the experiment aimed to gain insight into potential 
improvements that could be made to the tool in order to optimize its effectiveness.  
 
2.1 Experimental design 
The Real Time Simulations with SARA were performed at NLR’s ATC Research SIMulator 
(NARSIM). The experiment was conducted during four days that were spread out over two 
weeks. During the first two days, eight LVNL controllers participated (N=8). In the second 
week four MUAC controllers joined four LVNL controllers (N=2x4). The design was such that 
in the first week, the SARA concept within LVNL airspace could be investigated. During the 
second week, the influence of MUAC controllers could be researched. For consistency and 
comparison purposes, the data presented in this paper is data derived from LVNL controllers 
only. 
A single simulation run involved two controllers and two pseudo-pilots working in tandem for 
parts of the LVNL managed airspace (Amsterdam ACC sector 1 and sector 2). The pseudo-
pilots had radio contact with the controller for the specific sector. In week 2, the LVNL 





controlled aircraft in specific MUAC sectors (Coastal and Munster upper area sectors). Because 
NARSIM has eight controllers working positions, four identical runs could be executed 
simultaneously in the first week versus two identical simultaneous runs in the second week. 
Two familiarization runs were executed for each pair of controllers to familiarize them with the 
simulator and the SARA Human Machine Interface (HMI). Next, the pairs executed four 
experimental runs in the first week and three runs in the second week. For comparison purposes, 
the same traffic sample was used for all runs. However, to avoid familiarization with the traffic 
sample, the callsigns were shuffled between each run. Furthermore controllers switched 
working positions to also avoid effects resulting from the familiarity of the controllers with the 
traffic for a specific sector and inter- controller working strategies. The measured traffic sample 
contained 18 flights with destination Schiphol. In the first week the four experimental runs 
consisted of two baseline runs and two SARA runs. Run 1 resembled current operations and 
functioned as a baseline in which controllers had standard system support and delivered aircraft 
at the IAF with an accuracy of plus or minus 120 seconds or less compared to the EAT. Run 2 
functioned as a second baseline in which controllers had a stricter time target similar to the 
SARA runs (less than plus or minus 30 seconds) and limited system support. The support 
consisted of a delta time (ΔT; EAT – ETO) presented in the aircraft label. In runs 3 and 4, 
SARA provided speed-only advisories, and speed and route combinations respectively. During 
the second week MUAC controllers joined the four remaining LVNL controllers. A baseline run 
with a target of less than plus or minus 30 seconds, a SARA speed run and a SARA speed & 
route runs were performed (run 5, 6 and 7 respectively). Within MUAC airspace the controllers 
issued speed and route advisories to the aircraft. However, no route options were available 
within MUAC airspace. Therefore route advisories that were issued by SARA in MUAC 
airspace were only applicable in LVNL airspace. By providing the route instructions as early as 
possible the pseudo pilot was able to let the aircraft fly a more optimized descent profile. The 
properties of the simulation runs are depicted in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Properties of the simulation runs. Run 1, 2 and 5 are baseline runs, the others are the 
SARA runs. 
Run IAF target time (sec) System support Participating controllers 
1 Within +/- 120 Standard LVNL 
2 Within +/-  30 Delta T in label LVNL 
3 Within +/-  30 SARA speed LVNL 
4 Within +/-  30 SARA speed & route LVNL 
5 Within +/-  30 Delta T in label LVNL & MUAC 
6 Within +/-  30 SARA speed LVNL & MUAC 





The following data was gathered. First, the accuracy with which the controllers managed to 
meet the EAT for each aircraft was measured. This measurement was called ‘EAT adherence’. 
As a subjective measure of workload the Instantaneous Self Assessment (ISA) was used.  
Controllers were prompted for input every three minutes. Objective measures of workload 
consisted of calculating the total number of R/T calls (i.e. radiotelephony; the verbal instruction 
administered to the aircrew), the average time spent on R/T by each controller, and the number 
of instructions entered into the system through the Touch Input Devices (TID; i.e. after 
instructions are administered to the aircrew the controller enters them into the system via a 
TID). Directly after each simulator run, the controllers filled in an adapted version of the 
SASHA-Q Situation Awareness questionnaire (Dehn, 2008). Additionally, these questionnaires 
also contained open questions regarding workload, usability and acceptance. Interviews were 
held after each run to obtain in-depth information regarding their experiences with SARA. 




Repeated measures analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were used for statistical comparisons. 
Partial eta-squared (η2) is given as a measure of effect size. Pairwise comparisons were 
performed where appropriate with Bonferroni corrections. For each analysis an α < .05 was 
used. All analyses were performed using SPSS 15.0.1. Only the results of the first week were 
used in the statistical analyses (run 1 to 4). The number of participants in the second week (run 
5 to 7) was too few to perform meaningful statistical analyses. Therefore, these results are 
presented as an illustration and addition to the results of the first week. 
 
3.1 EAT adherence 
Data was obtained for 18 flights in the four experimental runs of the first week (run 1 to 4) and 
was analyzed for missing values and outliers. Data was gathered for four pairs of controllers. 
The results showed a significant delivery accuracy improvement when SARA was used, F(3,63) 








Figure 2. EAT adherence 
 
The average absolute EAT adherence improved from the two baseline runs (run 1 and 2) to the 
two SARA runs (around 57 and 25 seconds accuracy to around 12 seconds accuracy; run 3 and 
4). No significant differences were found between the speed only and the speed & route variants 
(run 3 and 4). Interestingly, setting the target at less than 30 seconds and providing the 
controllers with limited system support (a delta T in the aircraft label; run 2) already 
significantly improved the accuracy to approximately 25 seconds.  
The data for the second week show similar results (run 5 to 7). Delivery accuracy lies around 15 
to 20 seconds with limited system support (run 5) and the SARA runs (run 6 and 7). There 





Eight LVNL controllers produced nine ISA scores each during each run during the first week 
(run 1 to 4). A significant effect was found between the four runs, F(3,68) = 17.256, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .432. Workload in the SARA runs (run 3 and 4) was rated lower than the second baseline 
(run 2). Run 2 imposed a significantly higher workload on the controllers compared to the 
average of their ratings of the other runs, p < .01 (run 2 vs. run 1, 3 and 4). Run 4 (speed and 
route) was rated to be as equally demanding as run 3 (speed-only), p = .701.  
The results from the second week show similar results. The second baseline (run 5) appears to 
be imposing a higher workload on the controllers compared to the SARA runs for week 2 (run 6 







Figure 3. ISA scores 
 
3.2.2 R/T calls 
After removing one outlier from the dataset of the first week seven measurements were obtained 
for the total number of R/T calls for eight LVNL controllers. A significant effect was found for 
this type of workload measure, F(3,3) = 21.985, p < .05 ηp2 = .956. The SARA speed and 
routes run (run 4) required the lowest number of calls. The number of calls in this run was found 
to be less than baseline run 2 and the SARA speed-only run (run 3). A potential difference was 
found between run 4 and baseline run 1 (p = .067). SARA run 3 did not differ from the two 
baseline runs (run 1 and 2). The two baseline runs did not differ from each other. 
A large spread in the data was found for the baseline in week 2. This is likely due to the few 
participants in week 2 (4 LVNL controllers) who also showed large individual differences in the 
number of R/T calls. The SARA runs in week 2 (run 6 and 7) appear to be in line with the 







Figure 4. Number of R/T calls 
 
3.2.3 R/T Time  
Eight measurements were obtained for the total time spent on R/T calls (in seconds) for the four 
simulation runs in the first week. An ANOVA showed significant differences between the four 
runs, F(3,4) = 28.951, p < .01, ηp2 = .956. The lowest amount of time spent on R/T was found 
in the SARA speed & route run (run 4). There were no differences found between the first 
baseline (run 1) and the SARA speed only run (run 3). However, these two runs showed a 
reduced amount of R/T time compared to the second baseline (run 1 and 3 vs. run 2). No 
differences were found between the two baseline runs 1 and 2.  
Again, the data from the second week does not appear to be much different from the data 
captured during the first week. See Figure 5 for the means and standard deviations for time 








Figure 5. Time spent on R/T (s) 
 
3.2.4 TID inputs 
Eight measurements were obtained for the number of TID inputs for the four simulation runs in 
the first week. An ANOVA showed significant effects for the number of TID inputs, F(3,4) = 
11.091, p < .05, ηp2 = .893. The lowest number of inputs was found in the SARA speed & route 
run (run 4) compared to baseline run 2 and SARA run 3. A potential difference was visible 
between baseline run 1 and SARA run 4, p = .051. The highest number of inputs was found in 
baseline run 2 and potentially with baseline run 1, p = .081.  
The results for week 2 seem to be similar compared to week 1. Again, large individual 
differences were found for run 5 consistent with the number of R/T calls of run 5. The three 
runs performed in week 2 (run 5 to 7) do not show large differences in terms of TID input 
amongst themselves and between the first week and the second week (except compared to run 







Figure 6. Number of TID inputs 
 
3.3 Situation Awareness 
The questions from the SASHA-Q questionnaire were averaged to serve as a total SA score for 
each controller (N=8). Four questions were used that were applicable to both the SARA runs 
(run 3 and 4) and the baseline runs (run 1 and 2). The Repeated Measures ANOVA showed a 
significant difference in SA scores between the four runs in the first week, F(3,29) = 37.304, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .794. SARA runs 3 and 4 showed lower SA ratings compared to the two baseline 
runs 1 and 2. No significant differences were found between the two SARA runs (run 3 and 4) 
as well as between the two baseline runs (run 1 and 2). 
Data from the second week appear to be similar to the data found in week 1. It seems that the 
baseline run in week 2 run 5) received higher average SA scores compared to the SA scores for 








Figure 7. Situation Awareness ratings 
 
3.4 Qualitative results 
 
3.4.1 Workload 
A reduction in workload was experienced by the controllers with the use of SARA, especially 
with route-options enabled. This was especially noticeable in terms of R/T load. Some 
controllers however, mentioned that they felt that, with SARA active, other activities needed to 
be performed and not necessarily more or less. That is, a change in working method was 
experienced by some controllers that may have resulted in a lower physical task load, but a 
similar mental workload. 
With the current implementation of SARA only arriving aircraft are provided with speed and/or 
route advisories. This led some controllers to mention that potential difficulty of working with 
two working methods: the arrival traffic stream under SARA advisories and the departure traffic 
stream under ‘normal’ control which could potentially add to their workload.  
 
3.4.2 Situation Awareness  
Controllers mentioned that with SARA they felt ‘less engaged’ in the traffic situation compared 
to the baseline runs. It was mentioned that with SARA they followed an advice and monitored 
its progress. Some controllers mentioned that they felt that, because SARA produces an advice 
at the FIR entry to meet the time over the IAF, this would mean a solution for more than 
meeting the time alone, i.e. a conflict-free advice. This sometimes lead to controllers solve 
conflicts late rather than early. 
Controllers also mentioned that when SARA was active, they felt that they spent time to 
understand SARA’s ‘plan’ as part of an effort to create a mental picture of the traffic situation in 





Controllers changed their interaction with the SARA tool during the course of the simulations. 
In the second week it was observed that controllers regained some of their SA by not adhering 
to advisories all the time. It was observed that sometimes advisories were used as a ‘general 
guidance’ to give an aircraft a speed that would more or less be adequate to meet the time over 
the IAF. When SARA provided subsequent advisories, these would first be evaluated by the 
controllers for their usefulness before they were instructed. This was contrary to the controller’s 
behaviour early in the simulation where every given advice was accepted and instructed. 
 
3.4.3 Working method 
Controllers mentioned they had difficulty with building a traffic sequence whilst using SARA. 
In normal operations (as mimicked by runs 1 and 5) sequences were made with a separation of 5 
nm and an EAT adherence of less than plus or minus 120 seconds. With SARA the target was 
reduced to less than plus or minus 30 seconds. This clearly resulted in the controller focusing 




The aim of the experiment was understand the impact of SARA on its ability to support the 
controller in a more accurate delivery of traffic at the IAF. Furthermore, the experiment aimed 
to understand the impact of this support tool on controller functioning. Specific emphasis was 
laid on the controller’s workload and SA. The results showed that with the support of SARA the 
controller was able to deliver arrival traffic more accurately to the IAF. An initial gain in 
delivery accuracy was seen even when the controller had minimal system support (only a delta 
T in the aircraft label; run 2). However, with the aid of SARA this accuracy was further 
improved (run 3 and 4). Similar results were found in the second week (run 5, and 6 and 7 
respectively). 
With SARA subjective workload (ISA scores) did not increase compared to the baseline. 
However, Metzger and Parasuraman (2006) showed that communication and coordination tasks 
also can be a considerable source of workload to the controller, especially under high-traffic 
conditions. The results from this experiment showed that objective workload (number of R/T 
calls and TID inputs) reduced compared to the baseline, especially for SARA with speed and 
route options. This indicates that at an important part of controller workload can be reduced 
when using SARA. The results also showed that workload (subjectively as well as objectively 
measured) was highest for the run with minimal system support (run 2).  
Interestingly, SA was highest in the two baseline runs (run 1 and 2) and dropped significantly 
when SARA was used (although still rated as above average). The ATC Performance Model 
suggests that SA is one of the prime information processing components of a controller (Oprins, 





mental picture by perceiving, interpreting and anticipating on the traffic stream. Based on this 
continuous process the controller decides on the required instructions for aircraft in the traffic 
stream. With SARA part of this activity is transferred to SARA since it provides the controller 
with advisories that have not been part of the mental processes of the controller. Alternatively, 
the mental picture created by the controllers and the resulting instructions may differ from the 
solutions provided by SARA. Therefore, it is understandable that controllers rated their SA as 
lower compared to the baseline scenarios.  
SARA was specifically designed to aid the controller in an increased delivery accuracy of traffic 
over the IAF. It was reasoned that without SARA controllers would experience an unacceptable 
increase in their workload whilst aiming to reach a target of plus or minus less than 30 seconds. 
It is interesting to note that with minimal system support the controller is able to deliver traffic 
more accurately at the IAF. As expected, SA is maintained under these circumstances. 
However, it was also shown that workload is highest in this scenario (subjectively as well as 
objectively measured). This finding seems to support the notion that controllers need a support 
tool to improve their delivery performance. In this current setup however, this delivery 
improvement may come at the cost of a reduced, albeit still acceptable, level of SA. 
Controllers’ interaction with SARA changed over the course of the experiment. During the first 
week (run 1 to 4) controllers adhered to almost every advice provided by SARA. During the 
second week some controllers regained some of their SA by assessing every advice for its 
applicability. Also controllers were better able to anticipate on SARA’s advisories. This helped 
controllers to better manage their workload and SA. This suggests that sufficient familiarization 
with SARA is required before it is used in an operational setting. In this experiment, controllers 
became more used to SARA after a few hours. This may be an indicative time for training 
purposes when implementing SARA in an operational setting.  
The stricter focus on time (30 seconds vs. 120 seconds) had a large influence on the working 
strategies of the controllers. Nowadays time is of lesser importance since controllers focus on 
creating 5 nm sequences. When doing so they most often meet the required time over the IAF. 
Therefore, in present operations time is of less importance. With a target of within plus or minus 
30 seconds controllers will have to invest more effort to meet the target and requires a different 
mind set by the controllers. This may mean that generating sequences of 5 nm may not be 
enough to meet the target, but that more precise actions are required. In SESAR and NextGen 
there is a large focus on stricter time-based operations in which the entire trajectory of an 
aircraft is planned from gate to gate together with strict fixed times over waypoints (SESAR, 
2007). The experiences in this study may shed some light on the expected future working 
methods for controllers. 
In this experiment two versions of SARA were tested: a speed-only options and a speed and 
route option. A third option is foreseen that will incorporate conflict management (CM) to 
provide the controller with conflict-free speed and/or route advisories. The implementation of 





particular version of SARA was out of the scope of this experiment and it was therefore not 
possible to investigate its consequences for the controller. However previous studies on 
controller performance and workload under mature Free Flight may hint at considerations for 
design and implementation of this version. 
Free Flight is a concept that aims to shift most of the separation responsibility from the 
controller to the aircrew. In this situation controllers monitor the flow of traffic and only 
intercept to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding airport capacity, to prohibit unauthorized 
flight through special airspaces and to ensure safety (RTCA, 1995). This means that most of the 
time controllers only monitor the flow of traffic and are not actively controlling whilst still 
being responsible for the separation of aircraft.  
Galster, Duley, Masalonis and Parasuraman (2001) found that in a study simulating Free Flight 
controllers’ performance decreased in terms of speed of conflict detection and the number of 
detected self-separations (movements when two aircraft ensure separation without controller 
intervention). They concluded that controllers may become vulnerable under such a scheme in 
which separation decisions are ceded to the aircraft but controllers are still responsible for 
separation. 
A similar situation may occur in the case of SARA with a CM function. In the present study a 
decrease in SA was found with the use of SARA with speed and/or route options. This finding 
is similar to the out-of-the-loop-performance problem with an increased level of automation 
(Endsley and Kiris, 1995). A further impact on SA is expected when SARA’s advisories are 
conflict free. Checking SARA’s advisories for potential conflicts becomes unnecessary since 
they are intended to be conflict free. With controllers partially out of the loop, they may not be 
up to the challenge, due to complacency issues, in case conflicts are not resolvable by SARA 
(Galster et al., 2001; Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman and McGee, 1998).  
Several studies have provided recommendations on the out-of-the-loop-performance problem. It 
has been argued that to keep controller in the loop, they should retain some of their 
responsibilities and automation should support them in their decision-making (Wickens et al., 
1998). Previous research also showed that controllers more easily accept automation support if 
they are in command (Prevot, Lee, Callantine and Smith, 2003). That is, they found that 
solutions over which controllers had a choice were more readily accepted compared to solutions 
that appeared automatically. For SARA, this may mean that controllers should be able to have a 
choice about which speed and/or route combination they want to issue rather than having SARA 
presenting a single solution only. This may be especially relevant for SARA with CM. One 
solution for keeping the controller in the loop may be to present various conflict-free solutions 
which the controller can choose from, possibly with visual support. This way, controllers 
remain in control of the traffic, whilst SARA is able to support the controller in his decision-
making. 
A further design issue that was proven to be useful is the use of instant feedback. When 





consequences of their instructions through the change in delta T for that aircraft on the radar 
screen. This is in contrast to current operations in which, due to technical reasons, the change in 
delta T only slowly changes closer to the IAF. Instant feedback enhances the controller’s ability 
to stay on top the traffic situation by ‘scanning the traffic, identifying the need for an action, and 
issuing a proactive instruction’ (Prevot et al., 2003, p. 8). Any delay in such feedback may cause 
the controller to become behind in handling other traffic with reactive controlling behaviour as a 
result. The behaviour of the delta T function with SARA speed and/or route was shown to be a 
successful implementation of instant system feedback. 
The iterative design-cycle used in this study may be useful in overcoming such issues in further 
developing SARA for implementation. In such a cycle controllers and designers can test various 
alternatives in more detail. When a version is considered stable, Real-Time Simulations such as 
the one presented in this study can subsequently be used to investigate the impact on controller 
functioning (workload, SA and working method) in more depth. Based on these findings 
changes can be made to the design before it is implemented into an operational system. By 
using such a cycle (design, evaluation, simulation, implementation) with the users at the center 
of the developments, the potential for a successful system that can meet stricter future 
requirements whilst keeping controllers in the loop can be increased. 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
It can be concluded that SARA was successful in aiding the controller in reducing variability of 
arrival traffic over the IAF. A reduction of objective workload in combination with an increase 
in accuracy was observed without an increase in mental workload. SA was affected, although it 
was still rated above average. Familiarity with SARA may have played a role here as controllers 
changed their interaction with SARA in the second week and used it more as an advice tool, the 
way it was intended. The stricter focus on time rather than distance caused a larger impact than 
anticipated. This may mean that controllers need to change their way of thinking from 
‘thinking-in-distance’ to ‘thinking-in-time’ (Oprins, Zwaaf, Eriksson, Van de Merwe and Roe, 
2009). 
This experiment has provided some insights into the future of ATM and its consequences for the 
controller. SESAR and NextGen are aiming for stricter time-based-operations with subsequent 
automation support for the controllers. At present it is not immediately clear which impact this 
may have on controller functioning, especially with decision support tools utilizing conflict 
probes. A conflict-free SARA should be able to fully support the controller if strict design 
principles are taken in to account. The iterative design-cycle used in this study forms an integral 
part of the future developments of SARA such that controllers are supported in their tasks and 
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